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SCIENCE FOR JUDGES V INTRODUCTION
Margaret A. Berger∗
Once again, the Journal of Law and Policy is publishing
extended versions of papers relating to science and law that were
presented at a conference for federal and state judges.1 The
conference, which took place at Brooklyn Law School on April 1
and 2, 2005, was the fifth in a series of Science for Judges
programs funded by the Common Benefit Trust established in the
Silicone Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation. It was held
under the auspices of Brooklyn Law School’s Center for Health,
Science and Public Policy in collaboration with the Federal
Judicial Center, the National Center for State Courts, and the
Committee on Science, Technology and Law of the National
Academies of Science.
Science for Judges V dealt with two very different sets of
questions that arise in connection with science in the courtroom.
The first day’s session focused on Risk Assessment, a topic that
confronts judges when ruling on expert proof of causation in toxic
tort cases. The second day’s session considered issues relevant to
the Availability of Data, a subject of importance to the effective
functioning of both science and the law—research depends on data
∗
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1
Papers from previous Science for Judges programs can be found in 12 J.L.
& POL’Y 1, 1-53 (2003) (papers discussing the practice of epidemiology and the
science produced by administrative agencies); 12 J.L. & POL’Y 485, 485-639
(2004) (papers discussing toxicology and epidemiology); 13 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1179 (2005) (papers discussing the integrity of scientific research and forensic
evidence in criminal proceedings); and 13 J.L. & POL’Y 499-647 (2005) (papers
discussing Agent Orange and human behavior research). All papers are available
in electronic form at http://brooklaw.edu/centers/scienceforjudges/papers.php.
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and so does litigation.
In the first essay dealing with causation, Professor Gary
Marchant predicts that within the next decade toxic tort litigation
will be transformed by the availability of genetic information.2 His
discussion focuses on two different types of data that have the
potential to radically transform the process of proving causation: 1)
data on the genetic susceptibility of individual plaintiffs and 2)
genetic biomarkers of exposure and effect. Professor Marchant
examines the extent to which these types of evidence have been
introduced in judicial proceedings to date, and analyzes the
complex scientific and legal issues that must be resolved before the
legal system can utilize this information to make the outcomes of
toxic tort litigation more accurate and fair. Professor Marchant’s
essay provides judges and lawyers with a valuable preview of the
“doctrinal, ethical and institutional dilemmas” they will have to
confront in the near future.3
Just how important a role genetic information might play in
establishing causation becomes evident in reading Dr. Joseph
Rodricks’ paper which concludes that the problem of individual
disease causation has to date received inadequate treatment in the
scientific literature.4 After describing the objectives and
assumptions underlying regulatory risk assessments and examining
how toxicological and epidemiological information is used, he
explains why the results of such assessments cannot be
extrapolated to prove disease causation in individuals. Although he
sets out an analytical model for evaluating causation in individuals,
Dr. Rodricks cautions that much less of a scientific consensus
exists about appropriate scientific approaches than in the
regulatory context. He also notes that it is difficult to imagine how
plaintiffs could develop the evidence required by his model with
regard to chemicals that have not yet been studied. He concludes
by calling on the National Academies of Science to undertake a
study of general and specific causation that would clarify what
2

Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y
7, 8 (2006).
3
Id. at 37.
4
Joseph V. Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation in Humans Exposed to
Toxic Substances, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 39, 63 (2006).
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types of scientific evidence are relevant to prove causation in
judicial proceedings.
A totally different approach to issues relating to proof of
causation is offered by Lisa Heinzerling, a law professor, who
finds that the Supreme Court’s emphasis on guarding against
unreliable scientific evidence has led to numerous problems.5 She
faults the Supreme Court for opening the door to what she terms
judicial “junk science.” As examples of the courts’ disregard for
standard scientific practices, she discusses opinions that refuse to
accept a “weight of the evidence” approach, reject animal studies
and linear dose-response models, and exclude epidemiological
studies showing a relative risk of less than 2.0.6 Many additional
“doubts” about Daubert are voiced in Professor Heinzerling’s
essay. Her core concern is that evidentiary rulings under Daubert
have eroded substantive standards, particularly in toxic tort cases.
She concludes that the courts’ preoccupation with, and struggles to
master, complex issues regarding scientific expertise have led them
to ignore the subjects with which the law should be concerned.
Professors Eleanor Singer’s and Alan Morrison’s essays
examine the issues that arise when society’s ever growing needs
for data come up against other competing claims.7 After an
overview of recent federal legislation that affects access to
research data,8 Professor Singer turns to the complex policy issues
created by the explosion in technology. On the one hand, more
information than ever before is being collected by governmental
agencies. This information is of vital interest to researchers and is
needed to assist the government in designing, planning and
implementing its policies. On the other hand, public concerns
5

Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & Pol’y 65, 65-66 (2006)
(she first discusses the two Supreme Court opinions that established new
guidelines for expert testimony based on scientific knowledge, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) followed by General
Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)).
6
Id. at 68-74.
7
Eleanor Singer, Access to Research Data: Reconciling Risks and Benefits,
14 J.L. & Pol’y 85 (2006); Alan B. Morrison, Balancing Access to GovernmentControlled Information, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 115, 116 (2006).
8
Singer, supra note 7, at 89-91.
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about privacy and confidentiality have increased as advances in
technology have made intrusions into sensitive, personal data ever
more possible. After Professor Singer explains the costs and
benefits that must be balanced, she discusses ways in which the
confidentiality of research data can be safeguarded by techniques
such as data masking and creating synthetic data.9 It is quite clear
from Professor Singer’s discussion that the trade-offs between
making data freely available and protecting confidentiality are
complex and costly, and that the courts will of necessity be
involved in overseeing these choices. The decisions will have
significant consequences for researchers, litigants and our
citizenry.
Professor Morrison’s essay examines a variety of procedures
that may enable a requester to obtain information from different
branches of the government.10 After discussing issues that arise
under the Freedom of Information Act,11 Professor Morrison
examines the newer “Data Quality” laws,12 and then turns to
information sought in litigation, considering issues such as the
impact of Daubert, and the proper use of protective orders.13
Throughout, Professor Morrison’s emphasis is on the balancing of
competing interests that ultimately determines whether the
requested data will be disclosed. Seeing examples of this balancing
in the very different contexts which Professor Morrison considers
enables the reader to appreciate the many factors that decision
makers take, or ought to take, into account.
Professor Gillian Hadfield’s essay on data should be of great
interest to anyone concerned with the workings of the courts.14 Her
research examines the collection of data pertaining to the legal
system. She concludes that far too few data are available to allow
for a scientific, systematic assessment of how our federal and state
9

Id. at 109-11.
Morrison, supra note 7, at 116-23.
11
Id. at 116-20.
12
Id. at 120-23.
13
Id. at 132-36.
14
Gillian K. Hadfield, Judging Science: An Essay on the Unscientific Basis
of Beliefs about the Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better
Data about Law, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 137 (2006).
10
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judicial systems function, and notes the irony of judges enforcing
strict standards for the admission of scientific expert testimony
while they lack information about the impact of their practices. She
poses a number of important questions about the consequences of
the Daubert opinion that have not been empirically studied.15 The
problems in data collection that Professor Hadfield identifies make
it impossible to carry out such an investigation.16 Professor
Hadfield illustrates the frustrations of attempting empirical
research by describing her attempt to validate claims that federal
trials are vanishing.17 She finds that our knowledge about trial rates
is too slim to support conclusions on how our legal system could
be improved, and cautions that the difficult questions about the
effects of Daubert cannot be reliably answered unless we find a
way to collect and analyze the relevant data instead of relying on
anecdotes and personal experience.
In the last essay in this collection, Professor Claire Kelly
returns to a topic that was covered at a previous Science for Judges
conference18 and is touched on by some other contributors to this
volume19—the role of Daubert in the regulatory arena.20 After
discussing a number of ways in which a Daubert analysis could be
inserted into administrative decision-making,21 Professor Kelly
explains why she thinks such a paradigm shift would be
“unwarranted, unclear, and unhelpful.”22 Professor Kelly fears that
“Daubertization” would undermine administrative functioning and
would undo some of the gains achieved after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc.23 opened the door to greater administrative
15

Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 140-47.
17
Id. at 137-62.
18
Wendy E. Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies
Through the Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 589 (2004).
19
Morrison, supra note 7, at 130-31.
20
Claire R. Kelly, The Dangers of Daubert Creep in the Regulatory Realm,
14 J.L. & POL’Y 165 (2006).
21
Id. at 174-90.
22
Id. at 190.
23
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16
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flexibility. Like the Chevron shift which Professor Kelly
elucidates, a Daubert shift would be costly and lead to years of
uncertainty without the positive pay-off that Chevron ultimately
provided. The article bolsters this conclusion by examining the
variety of ways in which Daubert has been invoked in
administrative law cases to date.24
These brief descriptions of the essays that follow offer but a
glimpse of the complex, cutting-edge issues that are addressed. I
hope they whet the reader’s appetite to grapple with the essays
themselves.

24

Kelly, supra note 20, at 198-209.

